Governments in East Asia have pursued aggressive
industrial policies to develop national computer industries that
could compete with the U.S. Japan began targeting computer
production in the 1960s, employing a range of policy instruments
to prevent IBM from dominating the Japanese computer market and
develop national competitors to IBM. During the 1960s and 1970s,
Japan was the only country to successfully challenge IBM's control
of the market for mainframe computers. In the 1980s, three East
Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs) introduced their own
information technology policies aimed at promoting domestic
computer production and use. Korea, Taiwan and Singapore each
took advantage of opportunities provided by the personal computer
revolution to become important producers of computer systems and
components. Hong Kong's government took a hands-off approach, yet
Hong Kong's entrepreneurs took advantage of their proximity to
China to develop assembly operations for computers and components.
In the 1990s, the fortunes of these five countries diverged.
Taiwan and Singapore continued to grow into major international
centers of production for PC-related hardware, while Japan and
Korea experienced downturns in production and exports of computer
products. Hong Kong saw much of its production move to China, and
finally began to abandon its laissez faire approach to technology
development.
The experiences of these five countries' computer industries raises important questions about the factors that determine success and failure in high-technology industries such as computer production. The academic debate has mostly focused on the issue of industrial policy and whether government promotion is important or even desirable in such industries. The answer to this question is not apparent from the historical evidence. For instance, Japan's government coordinated approach to computers seems to have been highly successful for over twenty years (1965-1985), but has failed to respond to changes in the market in the past decade. Korea, Taiwan and Singapore seemed to be following similar paths to success with strong government support and guidance in the 1980s, yet in the 1990s Korea's computer industry has floundered while Taiwan and Singapore have flourished. Finally, Hong Kong's laissez faire strategy seemed adequate in the 1980s, but the government has found it necessary to take steps to improve the colony's technological capabilities and support its entrepreneurs in the 1990s.
How does one explain the relative success of these countries, and what does it portend for the future? Clearly, the old dichotomy of plan versus market orientation is inadequate to cope with the issues that are raised by developments in the computer industry in Asia and elsewhere in the world. This research develops an analytical framework that explains why countries succeed or fail as producers and users of computers at different times and under different circumstances. This framework embodies a number of factors at the national level which are organized broadly into the categories of business and government strategy. This analytical framework is placed in the context of the evolution of computer technologies and the international computer industry. The computer industry underwent a revolutionary change in structure in the 1980s. The old vertically integrated industry structure that prevailed in the mainframe computer industry was replaced by a horizontally segmented industry structure in the personal computer industry. This radical restructuring completely overturned the industry's power structure in a short time, humbling giants and enabling recent start-ups to dominate key segments of the industry. To understand the ups and downs of the Asian countries, it is necessary to understand the structure of the computer industry and the nature of the changes that have taken place. Based on this understanding, we can explain the performance of different countries at different times by looking at their industry structures and industrial policies.
The focal point of the analysis is the interaction between the structure and evolution of the international computer industry on the one hand, and the industry structures and government policies of individual countries on the other. Seen in this context, we can understand why a particular form of industry structure, such as the Japanese keiretsu, might have been effective at one time and not at another. We can also understand why such a structure might be effective in producing one type of product, such as flat-panel displays, and not another, such as packaged software applications. In addition, we can better explain why a certain policy approach might have been effective in developing a mainframe computer industry, but be counterproductive in personal computers. Looking at each country's unique characteristics, such as domestic market size, we can see why market protection might have been effective in Japan, but was unrealistic in Korea. We can also see how Hong Kong's position, vis-a-vis China, gave it opportunities as an intermediary and repackager of PCs, but also encouraged its companies to move production to the mainland rather than upgrading their own technological capabilities.
Focusing on the interaction between the global industry structure, national industry structure and government policy in five major participants in such a dynamic industry, we can gain useful insights into several issues. First, we can understand better the geographical evolution of computer production, i.e., why products are developed, produced and sold where they are. Second, we can understand why different industry structures might be conducive to different types of production, and whether existing industry structures can adapt to changes in technology, markets and production systems. Third, we can understand what types of policy approaches are likely to work for different countries based on their own industry structures and the changing international environment. Thus, we consider the lessons of the East Asian countries and their relevance to U.S. and European policymakers, as well as to developing countries who are beginning to design their own information technology policies. In addition, we consider the ramifications of our findings for competitiveness of the U.S. computer industry. U.S. companies have played an important role in stimulating the growth of computer production in Asia through their investment in offshore production and through sourcing from Asian suppliers. This global production strategy has helped them to reduce costs and concentrate on their own "core competencies." In the long run, however, such a strategy could result in loss of manufacturing capabilities, while continuing technology transfer could create strong competitors. Taiwan's Acer is an original equipment manufacturer to U.S. companies, but its own name brand PCs now rank tenth in the U.S. market. We look at what strategies U.S. companies might employ to continue to gain the benefits of globalization while strengthening their own competitive positions.
Finally, we use our conclusions about the past and present evolution of the industry as a basis for looking to the future. The computer industry is still evolving rapidly. Technological and market developments are causing a convergence of computing and communications, as seen in the explosive growth of the Internet and various private information networks. Boundaries between industries are being blurred by mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and creation of new products and services. Countries are developing plans for huge investments in national information infrastructures (NII) to facilitate the growth of new information-based industries. These developments have the potential to incite a revolution even more profound than the personal computer revolution of the 1980s. This revolution is only in its infancy, and its long-term consequences are impossible to predict from our present perspective. However, we can speak with some confidence about likely developments in the next few years and consider how those developments will resound in the five countries being discussed. Each of these countries is making plans for the future as they see it. We review those plans and look at how well-suited each countries' industry structure is for the evolving industry and market structures of the networked computing era. Finally, we assess the implications for the U.S. computer industry and U.S. government policy.
"Competing in Computers: Business and Government Strategy in East
Asia", Kenneth L. Kraemer and Jason Dedrick ©1997
| Institution: | Center for Research on Information Technology and Organizations Graduate School of Management University of California, Irvine |
| Title of award: | "Technology Policy and the Diffusion of Computing: A Study in Asia-Pacific Nations" |
| Dates of award: | 01/15/93 - 06/30/97 |
| Date of nugget: | 3/97 |
The researchers found that for the PC industry, focus, flexibility and speed are the keys to company success. As a result, the PC industry has tended to favor smaller firms over the vertically-integrated giants who dominated the mainframe era. Smaller companies tend to be more focused than larger ones and can change direction quickly to respond to new opportunities. Such companies tend to be more aggressive in pursuit of new market opportunities, and are more willing and able to bend the rules when necessary to get something done quickly. Large companies are often saddled with bureaucratic decision making and multiple layers of management that make it very hard to move quickly. Slow decision making can be disastrous in an industry whose product cycles are measured in months.
Even more important than sheer size, however, is corporate culture and management style. For instance, Hewlett-Packard is a very large company (over US$30 billion in revenues), but management is decentralized. Individual units operate almost as separate companies, and are encouraged to maximize their own profits even if it means competing with other H-P units. Indeed, while many large older firms have struggled or collapsed in the PC era, giants such as Toshiba and Hewlett Packard have thrived, ranking first in noteook PCs and printers, respectively. Microsoft is no startup any more, with over $10 billion in sales, yet it was able to refocus its corporate strategy to target the Internet in a matter of months. In the PC era, each segment of the industry has simply become too competitive for anything less than a total commitment to that business. Ultimately, the potential benefits of diversification are not enough to compensate for the loss of focus on individual market segments.
In the Asia-Pacific region, the benefits of focus over diversity for companies are equally clear. Taiwan's booming PC industry consists almost entirely of computer-only firms such as Acer and Mitac. Singapore's domestic leaders, Creative Technology, Aztech and IPC are all focused on computers, and most of the multinationals in Singapore's computer industry are American computer specialists such as Compaq and Seagate. On the other hand, most of Japan's and Korea's leading computer producers are large electronics conglomerates, for whom computers make up only part of their revenues. With the exception of Toshiba, none of these conglomerates has taken a leading position in any segment of the PC industry.
However, when we look at national, rather than corporate interests, we find that there are benefits from diversity. While more focused companies are generally more successful, countries benefit from having a diversified portfolio of companies producing a wide range of products. A portfolio of companies serves the same risk-minimizing function as a portfolio of stocks. A country that specializes in a few products and depends on a few companies will reap large benefits when demand for its key products are growing rapidly but a broader based industry is less vulnerable to downturns in any market segment. Concentration of production in a few companies can be as dangerous as concentration in a few products. The U.S. computer industry has seen the decline of IBM, DEC and Apple, and disappearance or near destruction of companies such as Data General, Prime and Wang, yet the slack has been taken up by the constant flow of new companies and continued success of other older companies. But when Japan's big computer makers all slumped in the early 1990s, there was no one else to take up the slack.
Countries also benefit from having a broad mix of large and small companies providing complementary capabilities. An industry cluster of complementary companies translates into national competitive advantage that can transcend traditional advantages in cost of labor or capital. Taiwan has a cluster of thousands of computer and electronics companies in the Taipei-Hsinchu area, while Singapore has a strong supplier base as well as skilled engineers for the disk drive industry. In each case, the capabilities of the industry cluster has helped sustain national competitiveness long after rising wages had eliminated an initial advantage in labor-intensive production.
What are the implications of these findings for policy
makers in the U.S. and elsewhere? The importance of focused
companies within a diversified industry structure argues for
promoting domestic competition, so that a few large companies are
not able to use their control over distribution channels or access
to capital to smother smaller competitors. Competition in each
segment of the industry also puts pressure on large companies to
focus on core businesses rather than trying to do everything. The
value of industry clusters with complementary capabilities also
calls for government investment in education, training and R&D in
order to supply the people and skills needed to deepen and upgrade
the capabilities of national industries. These findings are
relevant for market leaders such as the U.S. as well as other
countries looking for opportunities to participate in global
high-tech industries.