How can you design a contract to incentivize a self-minded agent to give you honest information? What does how we measure error say about what we are trying to predict? These questions drive the area of *information elicitation*, which has applications to economics, machine learning, statistics, finance, and engineering. Most of the topics below fall into this broad area, such as peer prediction, prediction markets, property elicitation, and mechanism design.

Ever since Glenn Brier sounded the warning call in 1950 that popular error measures were encouraging inaccurate meteorological forecasts, growing body of work in statistics, economics, and now computer science, has sought to design error measures which incentivize and assess forecasts. This diverse body of work goes by the name of *property elicitation*: the design of error measures (loss functions) that incentivize accurate statistical reports from agents or algorithms, and has applications to algorithmic economics, machine learning, finance, and engineering.
My work addresses fundamental questions in this area: what statistics can be elicited (expressed as the minimizer of an expected loss function), and how many parameters are required. [Image credit: Pooran Memari]
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Minimal peer prediction mechanisms truthfully elicit private information (e.g., opinions or experiences) from rational agents without the requirement that ground truth is eventually revealed. In this paper, we use a geometric perspective to prove that minimal peer prediction mechanisms are equivalent to power diagrams, a type of weighted Voronoi diagram. Using this characterization and results from computational geometry, we show that many of the mechanisms in the literature are unique up to affine transformations. We also show that classical peer prediction is "complete" in that every minimal mechanism can be written as a classical peer prediction mechanism for some scoring rule. Finally, we use our geometric characterization to develop a general method for constructing new truthful mechanisms, and we show how to optimize for the mechanisms’ effort incentives and robustness.

Minimal peer prediction mechanisms truthfully elicit private information (e.g., opinions or experiences) from rational agents without the requirement that ground truth is eventually revealed. In this paper, we use a geometric perspective to prove that minimal peer prediction mechanisms are equivalent to power diagrams, a type of weighted Voronoi diagram. Using this characterization and results from computational geometry, we show that many of the mechanisms in the literature are unique up to affine transformations, and introduce a general method to construct new truthful mechanisms.

Elicitation is the study of statistics or properties which are computable via empirical risk minimization. While several recent papers have approached the general question of which properties are elicitable, we suggest that this is the wrong question---all properties are elicitable by first eliciting the entire distribution or data set, and thus the important question is how elicitable. Specifically, what is the minimum number of regression parameters needed to compute the property?

Building on previous work, we introduce a new notion of elicitation complexity and lay the foundations for a calculus of elicitation. We establish several general results and techniques for proving upper and lower bounds on elicitation complexity. These results provide tight bounds for eliciting the Bayes risk of any loss, a large class of properties which includes spectral risk measures and several new properties of interest.

The elicitation of a statistic, or property of a distribution, is the task of devising proper scoring rules, equivalently proper losses, which incentivize an agent or algorithm to truthfully estimate the desired property of the underlying probability distribution.

Exploiting the connection of such elicitation to convex analysis, we address the vector-valued property case, which has received relatively little attention in the literature but is relevant for machine learning applications. We first provide a very general characterization of linear and ratio-of-linear properties, which resolves an open problem by unifying several previous characterizations in machine learning and statistics. We then ask which vectors of properties admit nonseparable scores, which cannot be expressed as a sum of scores for each coordinate separately, a natural desideratum for machine learning. We show that linear and ratio-of-linear do admit nonseparable scores, and provide evidence for the conjecture that these are the only such properties (up to link functions). Finally, we provide a general method for producing identification functions and address an open problem by showing that convex maximal level sets are insufficient for elicitability in general.

We study the problem of eliciting and aggregating probabilistic information from multiple agents. In order to successfully aggregate the predictions of agents, the principal needs to elicit some notion of confidence from agents, capturing how much experience or knowledge led to their predictions. To formalize this, we consider a principal who wishes to elicit predictions about a random variable from a group of Bayesian agents, each of whom have privately observed some independent samples of the random variable, and hopes to aggregate the predictions as if she had directly observed the samples of all agents. Leveraging techniques from Bayesian statistics, we represent confidence as the number of samples an agent has observed, which is quantified by a hyperparameter from a conjugate family of prior distributions. This then allows us to show that if the principal has access to a few samples, she can achieve her aggregation goal by eliciting predictions from agents using proper scoring rules. In particular, if she has access to one sample, she can successfully aggregate the agents' predictions if and only if every posterior predictive distribution corresponds to a unique value of the hyperparameter. Furthermore, this uniqueness holds for many common distributions of interest. When this uniqueness property does not hold, we construct a novel and intuitive mechanism where a principal with two samples can elicit and optimally aggregate the agents' predictions.

We present a model of truthful elicitation which generalizes and extends mechanisms, scoring rules, and a number of related settings that do not quite qualify as one or the other. Our main result is a characterization theorem, yielding characterizations for all of these settings, including a new characterization of scoring rules for non-convex sets of distributions. We generalize this model to eliciting some property of the agent's private information, and provide the first general characterization for this setting. We also show how this yields a new proof of a result in mechanism design due to Saks and Yu.

Ever since the Internet opened the floodgates to millions of users, each looking after their own interests, modern algorithm design has needed to be increasingly robust to strategic manipulation. Often, it is the inputs to these algorithms which are provided by strategic agents, who may lie for their own benefit, necessitating the design of algorithms which incentivize the truthful revelation of private information -- but how can this be done? This is a fundamental question with answers from many disciplines, from mechanism design to scoring rules and prediction markets. Each domain has its own model with its own assumptions, yet all seek schemes to gather private information from selfish agents, by leveraging incentives. Together, we refer to such models as elicitation.

This dissertation unifies and advances the theory of incentivized information elicitation. Using tools from convex analysis, we introduce a new model of elicitation with a matching characterization theorem which together encompass mechanism design, scoring rules, prediction markets, and other models. This lays a firm foundation on which the rest of the dissertation is built.

It is natural to consider a setting where agents report some alternate representation of their private information, called a property, rather than reporting it directly. We extend our model and characterization to this setting, revealing even deeper ties to convex analysis and convex duality, and we use these connections to prove new results for linear, smooth nonlinear, and finite-valued properties. Exploring the linear case further, we show a new four-fold equivalence between scoring rules, prediction markets, Bregman divergences, and generalized exponential families.

Applied to mechanism design, our framework offers a new perspective. By focusing on the (convex) consumer surplus function, we simplify a number of existing results, from the classic revenue equivalence theorem, to more recent characterizations of mechanism implementability.

Finally, we follow a line of research on the interpretation of prediction markets, relating a new stochastic framework to the classic Walrasian equilibrium and to stochastic mirror descent, thereby strengthening ties between prediction markets and machine learning.

We consider the design of

proper scoring rules, equivalentlyproper losses, when the goal is to elicit some function, known as aproperty, of the underlying distribution. We provide a full characterization of the class of proper scoring rules when the property is linear as a function of the input distribution. A key conclusion is that any such scoring rule can be written in the form of aBregman divergencefor some convex function. We also apply our results to the design of prediction market mechanisms, showing a strong equivalence between scoring rules for linear properties and automated prediction market makers.

Markets designed for the sole purpose of gathering information from the crowd are called *prediction markets*. These fascinating markets have a long history dating back to markets in Rome for predicting the next pope, but modern incarnations have a very different form. I study *automated market makers* which are centralized agents subsidized by the market which offer to buy or sell any security, for a price which updates automatically given the history of trade. Here the central questions are how to guarantee a bounded loss for the market maker, while preserving the quality of information and adapting to market conditions and external events.
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We propose a mechanism for purchasing information from a sequence of participants. The participants may simply hold data points they wish to sell, or may have more sophisticated information; either way, they are incentivized to participate as long as they believe their data points are representative or their information will improve the mechanism's future prediction on a test set. The mechanism, which draws on the principles of prediction markets, has a bounded budget and minimizes generalization error for Bregman divergence loss functions. We then show how to modify this mechanism to preserve the privacy of participants' information: At any given time, the current prices and predictions of the mechanism reveal almost no information about any one participant, yet in total over all participants, information is accurately aggregated.

Prediction markets are economic mechanisms for aggregating information about future events through sequential interactions with traders. The pricing mechanisms in these markets are known to be related to optimization algorithms in machine learning and through these connections we have some understanding of how equilibrium market prices relate to the beliefs of the traders in a market. However, little is known about rates and guarantees for the convergence of these sequential mechanisms, and two recent papers cite this as an important open question.

In this paper we show how some previously studied prediction market trading models can be understood as a natural generalization of randomized coordinate descent which we call randomized subspace descent (RSD). We establish convergence rates for RSD and leverage them to prove rates for the two prediction market models above, answering the open questions. Our results extend beyond standard centralized markets to arbitrary trade networks.

In this note we elaborate on an emerging connection between three areas of research: (a) the concept of a risk measure developed within financial mathematics for reasoning about risk attitudes of agents under uncertainty, (b) the design of automated market makers for prediction markets, and (c) the family of probability distributions known as exponential families.

We study information elicitation in cost-function-based combinatorial prediction markets when the market maker’s utility for information decreases over time. In the sudden revelation setting, it is known that some piece of information will be revealed to traders, and the market maker wishes to prevent guaranteed profits for trading on the sure information. In the gradual decrease setting, the market maker’s utility for (partial) information decreases continuously over time. We design adaptive cost functions for both settings which: (1) preserve the information previously gathered in the market; (2) eliminate (or diminish) rewards to traders for the publicly revealed information; (3) leave the reward structure unaffected for other information; and (4) maintain the market maker’s worst-case loss. Our constructions utilize mixed Bregman divergence, which matches our notion of utility for information.

We introduce a framework for automated market making for prediction markets, the volume parameterized market (VPM), in which securities are priced based on the market maker's current liabilities as well as the total volume of trade in the market. We provide a set of mathematical tools that can be used to analyze markets in this framework, and show that many existing market makers (including cost-function based markets, profit-charging markets, and buy-only markets) all fall into this framework as special cases. Using the framework, we design a new market maker, the perspective market, that satisfies four desirable properties (worst-case loss, no arbitrage, increasing liquidity, and shrinking spread) in the complex market setting, but fails to satisfy information incorporation. However, we show that the sacrifice of information incorporation is unavoidable: we prove an impossibility result showing that any market maker that prices securities based only on the trade history cannot satisfy all five properties simultaneously. Instead, we show that perspective markets may satisfy a weaker notion that we call center-price information incorporation.

We strengthen recent connections between prediction markets and learning by showing that a natural class of market makers can be understood as performing stochastic mirror descent when trader demands are sequentially drawn from a fixed distribution. This provides new insights into how market prices (and price paths) may be interpreted as a summary of the market's belief distribution by relating them to the optimization problem being solved. In particular, we show that under certain conditions the stationary point of the stochastic process of prices generated by the market is equal to the market's Walrasian equilibrium of classic market analysis. Together, these results suggest how traditional market making mechanisms might be replaced with general purpose learning algorithms while still retaining guarantees about their behaviour.

We consider the design of

proper scoring rules, equivalentlyproper losses, when the goal is to elicit some function, known as aproperty, of the underlying distribution. We provide a full characterization of the class of proper scoring rules when the property is linear as a function of the input distribution. A key conclusion is that any such scoring rule can be written in the form of aBregman divergencefor some convex function. We also apply our results to the design of prediction market mechanisms, showing a strong equivalence between scoring rules for linear properties and automated prediction market makers.

Machine Learning competitions such as the Netflix Prize have proven reasonably successful as a method of "crowdsourcing" prediction tasks. But these competitions have a number of weaknesses, particularly in the incentive structure they create for the participants. We propose a new approach, called a Crowdsourced Learning Mechanism, in which participants collaboratively "learn" a hypothesis for a given prediction task. The approach draws heavily from the concept of a prediction market, where traders bet on the likelihood of a future event. In our framework, the mechanism continues to publish the current hypothesis, and participants can modify this hypothesis by wagering on an update. The critical incentive property is that a participant profits exactly how much her update improves the performance of the hypothesis on a released test set.

How can you incentivize someone to tell the truth if you have no way of verifying their information, and never will? This is the central question of *peer prediction*, whose goal is to design mechanisms that bootstrap these incentives based on several agents' responses to the same query. The field derives its name from the intuition of scoring an agent's report based on how well it "predicts" another's. Peer prediction mechanisms are notoriously brittle and unstable, and recent work has sought to understand why, and design mechanisms which are more robust. Image: one proposed robust mechanism from [31, 27].
[ related papers + ]

Minimal peer prediction mechanisms truthfully elicit private information (e.g., opinions or experiences) from rational agents without the requirement that ground truth is eventually revealed. In this paper, we use a geometric perspective to prove that minimal peer prediction mechanisms are equivalent to power diagrams, a type of weighted Voronoi diagram. Using this characterization and results from computational geometry, we show that many of the mechanisms in the literature are unique up to affine transformations. We also show that classical peer prediction is "complete" in that every minimal mechanism can be written as a classical peer prediction mechanism for some scoring rule. Finally, we use our geometric characterization to develop a general method for constructing new truthful mechanisms, and we show how to optimize for the mechanisms’ effort incentives and robustness.

The problem of peer prediction is to elicit information from agents in settings without any objective ground truth against which to score reports. Peer prediction mechanisms seek to exploit correlations between signals to align incentives with truthful reports. A long-standing concern has been the possibility of uninformative equilibria. For binary signals, a multi-task output agreement (OA) mechanism due to Dasgupta and Ghosh achieves strong truthfulness, so that the truthful equilibrium strictly maximizes payoff. In this paper, we first characterize conditions on the signal distribution for which the OA mechanism remains strongly-truthful with non-binary signals. Our analysis also yields a greatly simplified proof of the earlier, binary-signal strong truthfulness result. We then introduce the multi-task CA mechanism, which extends the OA mechanism to multiple signals and provides informed truthfulness: no strategy provides more payoff in equilibrium than truthful reporting, and truthful reporting is strictly better than any uninformed strategy (where an agent avoids the effort of obtaining a signal). The CA mechanism is also maximally strongly truthful, in that no mechanism in a broader class of mechanisms is strongly truthful on more signal distributions. We then present a detail-free version of the CA mechanism that works without any knowledge requirements on the designer while retaining epsilon-informed truthfulness.

Peer prediction is the problem of eliciting private, but correlated, information from agents. By rewarding an agent for the amount that their report "predicts" that of another agent, mechanisms can promote effort and truthful reports. A common concern in peer prediction is the multiplicity of equilibria, perhaps including high-payoff equilibria that reveal no information. Rather than assume agents counterspeculate and compute an equilibrium, we adopt replicator dynamics as a model for population learning. We take the size of the basin of attraction of the truthful equilibrium as a proxy for the robustness of truthful play. We study different mechanism designs, using models estimated from real peer evaluations in several massive online courses. Among other observations, we confirm that recent mechanisms present a significant improvement in robustness over earlier approaches.

Minimal peer prediction mechanisms truthfully elicit private information (e.g., opinions or experiences) from rational agents without the requirement that ground truth is eventually revealed. In this paper, we use a geometric perspective to prove that minimal peer prediction mechanisms are equivalent to power diagrams, a type of weighted Voronoi diagram. Using this characterization and results from computational geometry, we show that many of the mechanisms in the literature are unique up to affine transformations, and introduce a general method to construct new truthful mechanisms.

In many real-world mathematical modeling applications, one eventually arrives at a complex *dynamical system*, a set of equations describing how the state of the system changes with time. How can we harness the ever-increasing computational power at our fingertips to make rigorous statements about these systems? For instance, one may wish to know the number of low-period orbits, or a lower bound on topological entropy. In particular, we would like a *completely automated* approach to producing these rigorous statements. My work in dynamics focuses on building such an approach using a combination of simple interval arithmetic to bound computational errors, and very powerful tools from computational topology, namely the discrete Conley index.
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It is well-known that any strong shift equivalence between subshifts of finite type can be expressed as a sequence of symbol splittings followed by a sequence of symbol amalgamations. We explore the simpler question of when a strong shift equivalence can be obtained using only amalgamations. Specifically, we consider the problem of determining the largest number of consecutive amalgamations of a given vertex shift, and show that it is NP-hard by reduction from the hitting set problem.

Combining two existing rigorous computational methods, for verifying hyperbolicity [Arai, 2007] and for computing topological entropy bounds [Day et al., 2008], we prove lower bounds on topological entropy for 43 hyperbolic plateaus of the Hénon map. We also examine the 16 area-preserving plateaus studied by Arai and compare our results with related work. Along the way, we augment the entropy algorithms of Day et al. with routines to optimize the algorithmic parameters and simplify the resulting semi-conjugate subshift.

We present new methods of automating the construction of index pairs, essential ingredients of discrete Conley index theory. These new algorithms are further steps in the direction of automating computer-assisted proofs of semi-conjugacies from a map on a manifold to a subshift of finite type. We apply these new algorithms to the standard map at different values of the perturbative parameter

and obtain rigorous lower bounds for its topological entropy forεin [.7, 2].ε

The aim of this paper is to introduce a method for computing rigorous lower bounds for topological entropy. The topological entropy of a dynamical system measures the number of trajectories that separate in finite time and quantifies the complexity of the system. Our method relies on extending existing computational Conley index techniques for constructing semiconjugate symbolic dynamical systems. Besides offering a description of the dynamics, the constructed symbol system allows for the computation of a lower bound for the topological entropy of the original system. Our overall goal is to construct symbolic dynamics that yield a high lower bound for entropy. The method described in this paper is algorithmic and, although it is computational, yields mathematically rigorous results. For illustration, we apply the method to the Hénon map, wherne we compute a rigorous lower bound of 0.4320 for topological entropy.

In this paper, we classify and describe a method for constructing fractal trees in three dimensions. We explore certain aspects of these trees, such as space-filling and self-contact.