Problem Set #2

CSCI 7000 - Cryptography - Spring 2010

Problem Set #2

Due: Mar 01st, 2010 at 4pm

1. Fix some integer n > 0. Let the set A = [0..2ⁿ - 1]. As we know, a function F : A -> A is a permutation if and only if F is one-to-one and onto. A permutation P : A -> A is a bit mixing permutation if and only if for all x in A, P(x) is a reordering of the bits of x. More precisely, if we write out x in binary as b(1) b(2) b(3) ... b(n), then P(x) = b(Q(1)) b(Q(2)) .... b(Q(n)) for some permutation Q : [1..n] -> [1..n].

Prove the following: if P is a bit mixing permutation then for all x and y in A, P(x xor y) = P(x) xor P(y).

2. Give an example of a permutation that does not have the property of problem #1. That is, a permutation P where P(x xor y) ≠ P(x) xor P(y).

3. Explain why the result in Problem 1 is relevant for the 3-round differential attack on DES we did in class.

4. This problem has two parts; the first part is the easier.

Define c(x) as the one's complement of x. Prove that for all 56-bit keys K and all 64-bit inputs X, we have that DES(K, X) = c(DES(c(K),c(X))).
Describe an attack on DES that uses this property to cut down the number of keys we have to try when exhaustively searching the keyspace.

5. Feel free to use hwdes.c for this problem. We will use the differential given in class for 3 rounds of DES. In particular, use the following pairs (by adding this code to hwdes.c):

int pairs[][2][2][2] = {
    {
        { {0x748502cd, 0x38451097}, {0x2e48787d, 0xfb8509e6} },
        { {0x38747564, 0x38451097}, {0xfc19cb45, 0xb6d9f494} }
    },
    {
        { {0x48691102, 0x6acdff31}, {0xac777016, 0x3ddc98e1} },
        { {0x375bd31f, 0x6acdff31}, {0x7d708f6d, 0x4bc7ef16} }
    },
    {
        { {0x357418da, 0x013fec86}, {0x5a799643, 0x9823cf12} },
        { {0x12549847, 0x013fec86}, {0xae46e276, 0x16c26b04} }
    }
};

Now mount a differential attack using these three pairs to completely recover the key. Note that you will have to do an exhaustive key search after the initial differential attack is done.

Turn in your code as usual along with an execution.

6. Let's construct a blockcipher E. The round function f(A, J) takes a 32-bit input A and a 32-bit round-key J. We define f(A, J) = A² + J mod 2³². Now define E as 16 Feistel rounds using f with 16 indepedent and random round keys.

Break E in the sense of IND-CPA using a differential attack.