Do Problem 19.1 in the Russell-Norvig text.
Do Problem 24.2 in the Russell-Norvig text.
5.3.1 A Zero-Sum Game (25 pts)
Consider the following zero-sum game matrix for two players, RED and BLUE. Each player has three strategies from which to choose (strategies "A", "B", and "C"). Here is the game matrix; the values shown are the payoff for RED (the payoff for BLUE is just the negative of these values).
| BLUE-A | BLUE-B | BLUE-C | |
| RED-A | -0.5 | 0.3 | 0.6 |
| RED-B | 0 | 1 | 1.2 |
| RED-C | 1 | 0.75 | 0.9 |
Eliminate, if possible, any dominated choices for either player; then calculate the value of this game for RED, allowing for the possibility of mixed strategies.
5.3.2 A Non-Zero-Sum Game (20 pts)
Consider the following non-zero-sum matrix for two players, BONNIE and CLYDE. Each player has two strategic choices ("A" and "B"). The game matrix is shown with CLYDE's payoff in italics:
| CLYDE-A | CLYDE-B | |||
| BONNIE-A | 3 | 3 | 0 | 6 |
| BONNIE-B | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
(a) Is this game a prisoner's dilemma situation? Why or why not?
(b) Does the game have an equilibrium point? Why or why not?